An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining

Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten
2000. Games and Economic Behavior, 33, 90-116.
 
We examine face-to-face interaction in a two-person bargaining game with incomplete information in which each bargainer can either have costs to be subtracted from her bargaining agreement payoff or not. The bargaining events are observed by onlookers who guess the cost situations of the participants. The work of Gauthier (1978) and Frank (1988) suggests that the onlookers detection accuracy exceeds chance accuracy because of involuntary signals inherent in the behavior of the bargainers. It is shown that cost guesses are somewhat more accurate than chance. This effect, however, is entirely explainable by the onlookers information about objective features of the bargaining process.
 

Energy, technical progress, and industrial growth

Dietmar Lindenberger
2000. In: Advances in Energy Studies - Energy Flows in Ecology and Economy, Proceedings of the International Workshop, S Ulgiati et al. (eds), Padova.
 

Equilibrium Bidding Without The Independence Axiom: A Graphical Analysis

Veronkia Grimm and Ulrich Schmidt
2000. Theory and Decision, 49(4), 361-374.
 

Revenue Equivalence and Income Taxation

Veronika Grimm and Ulrich Schmidt
2000. Journal of Economics and Finance, 24(1), 56-63.
 
This paper considers the classical independent private values model of auction theory in the presence of income taxation. We show that revenue equivalence remains valid if income taxes are proportional. Progressive and regressive taxes lead, in general, to asymmetries between bidders with the well-known consequence that revenue equivalence no longer holds. However, if symmetry of the bidders is maintained, progressive (regressive) income tax implies a higher (lower) expected revenue in first-price than in second-price auctions.
 

Modernization of regional energy systems

Dietmar Lindenberger and Reiner Kümmel
2000. In: Advances in Energy Studies - Exploring Supplies, Constraints, and Strategies. Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop, S Ulgiati (eds.), 85-94. Padova.
 

Energy, Creativity, and Economic Growth

Reiner Kümmel, Julian Henn and Dietmar Lindenberger
2000. In: Advances in Energy Studies - Exploring Supplies, Constraints, and Strategies, Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop, S Ulgiati et al. (eds.), 581-590. Padova.
 

Evolutionary Norm Enforcement

Werner Güth and Axel Ockenfels
2000. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 156(2), 335-347.
 

ERC - A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition

Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels
2000. American Economic Review, 90(1), 166-193.

According to the ISI Essential Social Science Indicators (SM) this paper qualified as a "hot paper" in March 2000 since it has attracted more attention in the previous two-month period than all other papers published in the previous two-year period in the field "Economics and Business". Siehe auch Wikipedia.
 
We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern. The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables. The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner's dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets.
 

Kurzexpertise zur ökonomischen und ökologischen Bewertung der Kraft-Wärme Kopplung

Felix Müsgens, Walter Schulz and Frank Starrmann
2000. Köln.
 

Wachstumsdynamik industrieller Volkswirtschaften: Energieabhängige Produktionsfunktionen und ein faktorpreisgesteuertes Optimierungsmodell

Dietmar Lindenberger
2000. Marburg.
 

Optimization of solar district heating systems: seasonal storage, heat pumps, and cogeneration

Dietmar Lindenberger, Thomas Bruckner, Helmuth M. Groskurth and Reiner Kümmel
2000. Energy - The International Journal, 25(7), 591-608.
 

Energie, Wirtschaftswachstum und Beschäftigung

Dietmar Lindenberger, Wolfgang Eichhorn and Reiner Kümmel
2000. In: Zur deutschen Energiewirtschaft an der Schwelle des neuen Jahrhunderts, W. Brune (ed.), 52-76. Stuttgart/Leipzig: Teubner.
 

Fair allocation and re-weighting of votes and voting power in the EU before and after the next enlargement

Matthias Sutter
2000. Journal of Theoretical Politics ,12, 433-449.

Laruelle and Widgrén (1998) have raised the question whether the allocation of voting power in the EU is fair. This paper extends some of their results insofar as it (i) deals with the consequences if the square root rule which is the basis for calculating fair shares of voting power is not fully applicable, (ii) calculates voting weights that lead to a fair allocation of voting power in the EU-Council and (iii) considers the effects of an EU-enlargement on the fair allocation of voting power.
 

The productive power of energy and economic evolution

Reiner Kümmel, Dietmar Lindenberger and Wolfgang Eichhorn
2000. Indian Journal of Applied Economics, 3, Special Issue in Honor of PA Samuelson, 231-262.
 

Flexible integration, EMU and relative voting power in the EU

Matthias Sutter
2000. Public Choice, 104, 41-62.

This paper studies the implications of flexible integration in the European Union. It analyses the voting power of member states in the Council of Ministers when differently sized subgroups of the EU are set up. European Monetary Union is referred to as the most important example of flexible integration. The Banzhaf-Index is calculated to study the distribution of voting power in the decision making process according to the stability and growth pact. The results show considerable fluctuations, especially for smaller countries, in relative voting power, the latter being defined as the relation between voting power and relative voting weight.
 

Optimale Auktionen

Veronika Grimm and Ulrich Schmidt
1999. Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium, 28, 12.
 

Fairness, Reziprozität und Eigennutz - Ökonomische Theorie und experimentelle Evidenz

Axel Ockenfels
1999. Die Einheit der Gesellschaftswissenschaften, Bd. 108. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck (Dissertationsschrift).
 

Auction Theory: A Survey

Veronika Grimm
1999: In: The Current State of Economic Science, S.B. Dahiya (eds.), Rothak:Spellbound Publications.
 
This survey is about the theory of single object auctions. We analyze the performance of the four standard auctions in a benchmark model and state the well known revenue equivalence theorem. Next, we relax the four main assumptions and compare the outcomes of the different auction forms. Finally a review of the theory of optimal auctions is provided, i. e. we derive the rules of the auction that maximizes the expected revenue of the auctioneer.
 

Voting and voting power in the Stability Pact

Matthias Sutter
1999. Homo Oeconomicus, 15, 521-542.

This paper analyses the distribution of voting power in the excessive deficit procedure as clarified by the stability pact. The main results are that large countries can exert more power to avoid being fined when having an excessive deficit than smaller countries and that the voting procedure favours countries opposed to sanctioning excessive deficits. Bloc formation pays off for members of a bloc, especially when the vote is on monetary sanctions. The effects of bloc formation on single players' voting power show no systematic bias in favour of certain countries. An already existing bloc can gain power by the formation of an additional bloc.
 

Fairneß, Reziprozität und Eigennutz - Ökonomische Theorie und experimentelle Evidenz

Axel Ockenfels
1999. Die Einheit der Gesellschaftswissenschaften, 108, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
 

Signaling and identifying the willingness to cooperate: some experimental results

Jeannette Brosig
1999. In: Operations Research Proceedings, Inderfurth, K., G. Schwödiauer, W. Domschke, F. Juhnke, P. Kleinschmidt, G. Wäscher (eds.), Springer Verlag.
 

Types and Patterns - An Experimental East-West-German Comparison of Cooperation and Solidarity

Axel Ockenfels and Joachim Weimann
1999. Journal of Public Economics, 71(2), 275-287.
 

Measuring Motivations for the Reciprocal Responses Observed in a Simple Dilemma Game

Gary E. Bolton, Jordi Brandts and Axel Ockenfels
1998. Experimental Economics, 1(3), 207-219.
 

Strategy and Equity: An ERC-Analysis of the Güth-van Damme Game

Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels
1998. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42(2), 215-226.
 
Güth and van Damme's three-person bargaining experiment challenges conventional thinking about how self-interest, as well as fairness, influences behavior. Among other things, the experiment demonstrates that people care about receiving their own fair share, but care far less about how the remainder is divided among the other bargainers. The ERC model posits that, along with pecuniary gain, people are motivated by their own relative payoff standing. Beyond this, ERC employs standard game theoretic concepts. We describe the general ERC model, and show that it predicts many of the key phenomena observed in the experiment.
 

Stabilitätspakt: Eine fiktive ex-post Anwendung und reale Probleme der Zukunft

Matthias Sutter
1998. Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 47, 317-334.

This article deals with the stability and growth pact approved of by the EU´s heads of state or government in Amsterdam in June 1997. The pact´s aim is to provide budgetary discipline in Stage 3 of European Monetary Union in order to ensure a stable common currency and the European Central Bank´s independence. Excessive deficits are evaluated by taking into account real GDP growth. A hypothetical application of the stability pact for the period 1979 to 1996 shows considerable problems for some future EMU-members if structural deficits are not reduced before entering EMU. The credibility of the stability pact within EMU will depend upon timely and exact statistical data as well as on a strict application of its rules. On both accounts there remain doubts.
 

An Experimental Solidarity Game

Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten
1998. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34(4), 517-539.
 

Book Review of Theo Offerman's 'Belief and Decision Rules in Public Good Games'

Axel Ockenfels
1998. European Journal of Politial Economy, 14, 803-806.
 

Energie, Wirtschaftswachtum und technischer Fortschritt

Dietmar Lindenberger
1997. Physikalische Blätter, 53, 869-875.
 

Energy-dependent production functions, technological change, and industrial evolution

Reiner Kümmel, A. Kunkel and Dietmar Lindenberger
1996. In: Econometrics of Environment and Transdisciplinarity, Vol.II, Applied Econometrics Association, A. Barazani, F. Carlevaro (eds.), 593-611. Lisbon/Geneva.