Optimierung des Verhandlungsgebots auf dem Telekommunikationsmarkt
Vitali Gretschko, Axel Ockenfels and Achim Wambach
2024. Wirtschaftsdienst, 104(11), 794-799.
Die Bundesnetzagentur plant, die Frequenznutzungsrechte der etablierten Mobilfunkbetreiber bis 2030 zu verlängern, verbunden mit einem Verhandlungsgebot für den Zugang von 1&1 zu Frequenzen unter 1 GHz. Diese Analyse identifiziert zentrale Schwachstellen des Verhandlungsgebots: fehlende Klarheit über regulatorische Eingriffe bei Nichteinigung, ineffiziente Last-Minute-Effekte, asymmetrische Verhandlungsmacht und Probleme bei der Offenlegung sensibler Informationen. Als Alternative wird ein strukturiertes Auktionsverfahren vorgeschlagen, das die Produktdefinition durch 1&1, einen expliziten Höchstpreis und eine „descending clock auction“ umfasst, um einen effizienteren und transparenteren Vergabeprozess zu ermöglichen.
Household reduction of gas consumption in the energy crisis is not explained by individual economic incentives
Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt,Christoph Feldhaus, Axel Ockenfels and Matthias Sutter
2024. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), 121(48).
During the 2022/23 winter, substantial natural gas savings in Germany followed the disruption of gas supplies from Russia. This study explores whether these savings were driven by governmental policies and programs launched by public utilities, such as Germany’s “gas price brake” and utility-led programs that created individual economic savings incentives. Through a survey and a field experiment with a German gas supplier, we find that such programs and the corresponding (individual) economic incentives were largely irrelevant for households’ gas savings. Our findings indicate that the crisis, along with the extensive societal engagement it generated, induced the savings rather than the individual incentives.
Impartial policymakers prefer to impose carbon pricing to capping, especially when combined with offsets
Felix Kölle, Dorothea Kübler and Axel Ockenfels
2024. Ecological Economics, 226.
Sustainable socio-economic development requires a global reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. We utilize an incentivized experiment to map the preferences of ‘policymakers’ over climate actions of ‘decision-makers’. Our design guarantees that these preferences are unaffected by selfish motives such as a concern about being re-elected or an unwillingness to pay for the greater good. Few of our impartial policymakers choose interventions that leave the autonomy of decision-makers' completely untouched. The choice patterns of those who intervene suggest that policymakers care not only about minimizing emissions, but also about how emissions are reduced. Policymakers strongly prefer pricing policies over capping emissions, and among the pricing policies, they prefer those that include voluntary carbon offsets, even if this leaves considerable scope for decision-makers to selfishly emit CO2. The reason is that policymakers expect decision-makers to voluntarily offset some of their emissions at their own cost, and believe that this would eventually improve the outcome in terms of both emissions and the decision-makers' profit relative to a standard carbon pricing policy (without offsetting). Our decision-making data confirm this expectation.
Designing a Kidney Exchange Program in Germany: Simulations and Recommendations
Itai Ashlagi, Ágnes Cseh, David Manlove, Axel Ockenfels and William Pettersson 2024. Central European Journal of Operations Research.
We examine some of the opportunities and challenges concerned with establishing a centralized national kidney exchange program in Germany. Despite the many advantages of a national program, without deliberate design and policy intervention, a fragmented kidney exchange program may emerge. We study a number of collaboration strategies, and resulting simulations suggest that transplant centers may find it advantageous not to fully participate, resulting in a net reduction in the number of transplants. These results also suggest that allowing more forms of kidney exchange, such as three-way exchanges and non-directed donations, can significantly increase the number of transplants while making participation in a national program more attractive and thus national coordination and cooperation more robust. We propose a multi-level policy approach that is easy to implement and would promote an efficient German kidney exchange program that benefits recipients, donors and hospitals.
Auction Design for Germany´s Power Station Strategy
Peter Cramton and Axel Ockenfels
2024. Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, 48, 20-31.
Germany´s power station strategy of investing in hydrogen-ready gas-fired power plants requires subsidies; market and regulatory failures currently undermine the units´ anticipated future cash flows. Our proposed competitive procurement auction, designed to restore the revenue shortfall - the missing money - guarantees that the units will be built, ensuring a more sustainable and secure energy future for Germany. The procured product bundles physical, hydrogen-ready capacity with a financial option to deliver energy when prices are high. After conversion to hydrogen, a government hedge will be provided to cover the fuel cost difference to natural gas minus the carbon price. The design of the auctions should avoid locational preferences, letting expectations about future market incentives guide efficient location choices. Auctions can be conducted as open or sealed-bid auctions, and should use a pay-as-clear price rather than pay-as-bid to encourage more competitive bidding. A unit is affected by the future capacity mechanism and other market reforms. Our approach accommodates many capacity market mechanisms and interacts most smoothly with state-of-the-art energy and capacity markets.
Gradual and Flexible Procurement: A Note on Germany's Power Station Strategy
Peter Cramton and Axel Ockenfels
2024. Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, 48, 32–41.
We propose a novel approach to electricity capacity procurement based on robust economic theory and extensive experience. Our approach builds upon the current best practice but allows for more flexible and gradual government purchases. Using Germany's power station strategy as an example, we suggest gradual procurement in hourly auctions over three years, which effectively mitigates market power and allows fine product granularity in time and space. Moreover, it aligns with a rational buyer's purchase and risk management strategy by enabling the purchase of a blend of forward energy and energy options that vary by time and delivery location, tailored to the buyer's specific needs. By promoting efficient pricing, competition, and innovation through coordinated forward trading, the gradual and flexible approach also addresses the shortcomings of existing capacity mechanisms and forward markets as ACER and the European Commission identified.
Organspenden: Überkreuzspende allen ermöglichen
Axel Ockenfels
2024. Wirtschaftsdienst, 8.
Am 17. Juli 2024 hat das Bundeskabinett den Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Transplantationsgesetzes verabschiedet, das die Nieren-Überkreuzspende und weitere Varianten der Lebendspende ermöglichen soll. Bei der Überkreuzspende handelt es sich um ein Verfahren, bei dem zwei spendewillige Personen, die für den jeweiligen Partner nicht als Spender geeignet sind, ihre Nieren „über Kreuz“ spenden: Spender A spendet seine Niere dem Empfänger B, Spender B spendet an Empfänger A, sodass beide Empfänger eine passende (kompatible) Niere erhalten.
An open-access market for global communications
Peter Cramton, Erik Bohlin, Simon Brandkamp, Jason Dark, Darrell Hoy, Albert S. Kyle, David Malec, Axel Ockenfels and Chris Wilkens
2024. Telecommunications Policy, 48(9).
An open-access market design is presented to manage network congestion and optimize network use and value. Open access eliminates the walled-garden approach; instead, it commoditizes communications network capacity while decentralizing access to a transparent wholesale market. It ensures that scarce capacity is put to its best use by providing a platform for efficient trade. The market operates without friction using flow trading. It allows participants to bid persistent piecewise-linear downward-sloping demand curves for portfolios of products, gradually adjusting positions toward targeted needs. Flow trading allows fine granularity of products in time and location, creating complete markets. Liquidity and computational feasibility are maintained despite trading millions of interrelated forward and real-time products. Participants manage risk and adverse price impact through trade-to-target strategies. The market operator clears the market every hour, finding unique prices and quantities that maximize as-bid social welfare. Prices, aggregate quantities, and the slope of the aggregate net demand are public. The market operator observes positions, enabling it to optimize collateral requirements to minimize default risk. Priority pricing is used to manage real-time imbalances. An application of the model is developed for intersatellite wholesale communications with optical (laser-beamed) mesh networks in space, showing several efficiency gains.
Nierentausch in Deutschland: Analysen und Empfehlungen
Ockenfels, Axel, Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver
2024. Medizinrecht, 42, 567-572.
Der Referentenentwurf zur Novellierung des Transplantationsgesetzes 1 sieht die Einführung einer Überkreuzlebendspende vor. Dies ist ein wichtiger Schritt, um die Anzahl der Lebendnierenspenden und -transplantationen zu erhöhen. Basierend auf den Erfahrungen aus anderen Ländern empfehlen wir jedoch zwei Anpassungen: Erstens sollte auch kompatiblen Spender-Empfänger-Paaren die Teilnahme am Tauschprogramm ermöglicht werden und zweitens sollten anonyme, nicht-gerichtete Spenden primär zur Initiierung von Spendenketten genutzt werden. Die Umsetzung dieser Empfehlungen würde die Effektivität des geplanten Nierentauschprogramms zugunsten der Patienten und Spender deutlich verbessern.
Organspenden: Neue Wege beschreiten
Ágnes Cseh, Christine Kurschat and Axel Ockenfels
2024. Wirtschaftsdienst, 5, 293.
In Deutschland warten derzeit rund 6.600 Menschen auf eine Spenderniere. Nur ein Bruchteil von ihnen wird rechtzeitig ein Spenderorgan erhalten. Das geltende Transplantationsgesetz schließt die sogenannte Überkreuz-Lebendspende aus, obwohl sie die angespannte Situation etwas entschärfen könnte und in vielen anderen Ländern längst erfolgreich praktiziert wird. Das soll sich nun ändern. Was ist bei der Gesetzesänderung zu beachten?
Quality and safety for substances of human origins: scientific evidence and the new EU regulations
Julio J. Elias, Nicola Lacetera, Mario Macis, Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E Roth
2024. BMJ Global Health, 9(4).
The new European Union (EU) ‘Regulation on standards of quality and safety for substances of human origin (SoHOs) intended for human application’ is based on a long-standing diffidence towards offering compensation to donors of SoHOs. We point to recent, growing empirical evidence indicating that carefully designed compensation can increase the supply of SoHOs without negatively affecting quality and safety. We also elaborate arguments that address some of the moral concerns that motivate the aversion to payments. As member states proceed to adopt the new EU regulation, our article may provide insights on how to achieve both self-sufficiency and safety.
Anreize für Altruismus: Über die Auswirkungen unbezahlter Blutplasmaspenden
Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth
2024. Medizinrecht, 42, 175-176.
Die Europäische Kommission und der Gesundheitsausschuss des Europäischen Parlaments planen neue Regelungen für die Verwendung von Substanzen menschlichen Ursprungs wie Blutplasma, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf dem Verbot finanzieller Anreize für Spender liegt. Der Plan berücksichtigt nicht ausreichend die negativen Auswirkungen auf die Spender, auf die globale Versorgung mit benötigten Substanzen und damit auf die Gesundheit, das Wohlergehen und das Leben derer, die diese Substanzen benötigen. Die neuen Vorschriften für Blutplasma würden beispielsweise den weltweiten Mangel verschärfen, die Preise erhöhen und die Abhängigkeit von anderen Ländern, insbesondere den USA, verstärken. Die Gesetzgebung sollte einen ausgewogenen und empirisch fundierten Ansatz verfolgen, um die Interessen von Spendern und Empfängern gleichermaßen zu schützen.
Multi-rater Performance Evaluations and Incentives
Axel Ockenfels, Dirk Sliwka and Peter Werner
Forthcoming. Journal of Labor Economics.
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms this prediction and finds evidence that this can indeed be attributed to accurate information processing in the group. Moreover, when employee compensation depends on evaluations, multi-rater evaluations tend to be associated with higher performance.
Strategic Climate Cooperation and Greenhouse Gas Price Coordination
Kimberly Clausing, Peter Cramton, Axel Ockenfels and Catherine Wolfram
2024. Intereconomics, 59(1), 55–56.
Over the past year, policymakers, academics and non-governmental organizations on both sides of the Atlantic have begun talking about how to coordinate policies to reduce methane emissions from the oil and gas sector. While this may seem like an obscure, technical topic, moving forward with this initiative is critical, as the implications for climate cooperation – not just for the US and EU, but for the global community – are profound. In this article, we explore the reasons behind this assertion.