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Overbidding in First Price Private Value Auctions: Implications of a Multi-Unit Auction Experiment

Dirk Engelmann and Veronika Grimm
2004. In: Advances in Public Economics: Utility, Choice, and Welfare, U. Schmidt and S. Traub (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers.


Michael Bartels und Dietmar Lindenberger
2004. In: Energiemodelle zum europäischen Klimaschutz. Der Beitrag der deutschen Energiewirtschaft, Forum für Energiemodelle und Energiewirtschaftliche Systemanalysen in Deutschland (Hrsg.), Umwelt- und Ressourcenökonomik, 22, LIT Verlag, Münster, 285-360.

Trust among Internet Traders: A Behavioral Economics Approach

Gary E. Bolton, Elena Katok and Axel Ockenfels
2004. Analyse und Kritik, 26, 185-202.

Take or leave? Distributional Conflict in an Ongoing Game

Anthony de Jasay, Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt and Axel Ockenfels
2004. Kyklos, 57(2), 217-235.

A Dialogue Concerning the Nature of Rationality

Hartmut Kliemt and Axel Ockenfels
2004. In: Advances in Understanding Strategic Behavior: Game Theory, Experiments and Bounded Rationality, Steffen Huck (ed.), 105-119. Hampshire: Palgrave.

In the spirit of David Hume`s "dialogues concerning natural religion" this dialogue presents several views on the nature of rationality and its role in economics. Definite solutions of problems are not on offer. There may, however, be a range of persuasive reasons to prefer some views over others.

Prognose bei strategischer Unsicherheit

Axel Ockenfels
2004. In: Energieprognose angesichts globaler Unsicherheit, Prognos AG (ed.), 15-25.

Modellrechnungen zur Wirtschaftlichkeit der Verdichtung und Erweiterung von Fernwärmenetzen und der Rolle der KWK in der deutschen Stromerzeugung

Michael Bartels, Dietmar Lindenberger and Walter Schulz
2004. In: Strategien und Technologien einer pluralistischen Fern- und Nahwärmeversorgung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung und regenerativer Energien (Pluralistische Wärmeversorgung), 3(2), Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Wärme und Heizkraftwirtschaft e.V. (eds.), 83-141. Frankfurt am Main.

Gemeinsam mit acht weiteren Projektpartnern wurde der Ausbau der Fern- und Nahwärmeversorgung in Deutschland untersucht. Der Beitrag des EWI bestand in der Ermittlung der kostenminimalen Strom- und Wärmebedarfsdeckung bis 2020. Die durchgeführten Rechnungen zeigen, dass eine weitere Verdichtung der bestehenden Fernwärmenetze in allen Szenarien wirtschaftlich ist. Die teurere Netzerweiterung ist dagegen nur begrenzt wirtschaftlich, obwohl hier im Vergleich zur Verdichtung ein deutlich höheres Anschlusspotenzial vorhanden ist.

How Effective are Electronic Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation

Gary E. Bolton, Elena Katok and Axel Ockenfels
2004. Management Science, 50(11), 1587-1602.
Electronic reputation or feedback mechanisms aim to mitigate the moral hazard problems associated with exchange among strangers by providing the type of information available in more traditional close-knit groups, where members are frequently involved in one another's dealings. In this paper, we compare trading in a market with online feedback (as implemented by many Internet markets) to a market without feedback, as well as to a market in which the same people interact with one another repeatedly (partners market). We find that, while the feedback mechanism induces quite a substantial improvement in transaction efficiency, it also exhibits a kind of public goods problem in that, unlike in the partners market, the benefits of trust and trustworthy behavior go to the whole community and are not completely internalized. We discuss the implications of this perspective for improving feedback systems.

An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments

Ben Greiner
2004. In: Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003. GWDG Bericht 63, Kurt Kremer, Volker Macho (eds.), 79-93. Göttingen: Ges. für Wiss. Datenverarbeitung. 
In this paper we introduce the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE). With this software experimenters have a free, convenient and very powerful tool to organize their experiments and sessions in a standardized way. Additionally, ORSEE provides subject pool statistics, a laboratory calendar and tools for scientific exchange. A test system has been installed in order to visually support the reader while reading the paper.

The excess burden of tax evasion - An experimental detection-concealment contest

Ralph Bayer and Matthias Sutter
2004. Working Paper.

We present an experimental study on the wasted resources associated with tax evasion. This waste arises from taxpayers and tax authorities investing costly effort in the concealment and detection of tax evasion. We show that these socially inefficient efforts - as well as the frequency of tax evasion - depend positively on the prevailing tax rate, but not on the fine which is imposed in the event of detected tax evasion. Tax evasion is less frequent, though, than a model with risk neutral taxpayers predicts. We find evidence that this is due to individual moral constraints rather than to risk aversion.

The excess burden of tax evasion - An experimental detection-concealment contest

Die Rolle der KWK und der Fernwärme im Jahre 2020 - Ergebnisse des Modells CEEM

Walter Schulz and Michael Bartels
2004. Tagungsband der AGFW-Vortragstagung "Energie für Menschen mit Weitblick", AGFW (eds.), Leipzig, 3-4.


Modellgestütze Analyse der Auswirkungen des CO2-Zertifikatehandels auf die deutsche Elektrizitätswirtschaft

Markus Peek, Michael Bartels und Christoph Gatzen
2004. Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, 1, 65-73.

Der Beitrag stellt die Ergebnisse einer Analyse der Auswirkungen der Einführung eines CO2-Zertifikatehandels in der Europäischen Union auf die Struktur der Stromerzeugung in Deutschland und die Gewinne für bestehende Kraftwerke vor. Die Analyse wird mit dem Strommarktmodell GEMS (German Electricity Market Simulation) durchgeführt, das eine realitätsnahe Simulation der zukünftigen Stromerzeugung unter gegebenen Rahmenannahmen (Politikszenarien) erlaubt.

On Procurement Auctions of Complementary Goods

Veronika Grimm
2004. IVIE Working Paper, No. WP-AD 2004-02.
We compare sequential and bundle auctions in a framework of successive procurement situations, where current success positively affects future market opportunities and competition varies across projects. We find that - if allocation of the projects has to be ensured - bundle auctions with subsequent resale opportunities yield a lower and less risky overall price, whereas sequential procurement leads to the efficient outcome.

The Online Recruitment System ORSEE 2.0 - A Guide for the Organization of Experiments in Economics

Ben Greiner
2004. Working Paper Series in Economics, University of Cologne, No. 10.

We discuss several issues regarding the organization of economic laboratory experiments such as subject pool, recruitment, scheduling, and show how we solved them with the help of the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE) version 2.0. With this integrated software experimenters have a free, convenient, and very powerful tool to organize their experiments and sessions in a standardized way. Key features are: PHP/MySQL application, multiple language/ laboratory/ subject pool/ experimenters/ experiment types/ experiment classes support, attribute query selection, random recruitment, experiment calendar, automated reputation system, automated invitation and rule based reminder mailing, subjects manage their own account, overview about registration state, user rights management, pdf output and mailing, complete logging and statistics, and customizable layout.
In version 2.0 the software has been completely reprogrammed in PHP. Several new features have been added. A test system has been installed in order to visually support the reader while reading the manual (www.orsee.org).

The Online Recruitment System ORSEE 2.0 - A Guide for the Organization of Experiments in Economics

Bounded Rationality in Bargaining Games: Do Proposers Believe That Responders Reject an Equal Split?

Ben Greiner
2004. Working Paper Series in Economics, University of Cologne, No. 11.

Puzzled by the experimental results of the 'impunity game' by Bolton and Zwick (1995) we replicate the game and alter it in a systematic manner. We find that although almost nobody actually rejects an offered equal split in a bargaining game, proposers behave as if there would be a considerably large rejection rate for equal splits. This result is inconsistent with existing models of economic decision making. This includes models of selfish players as well as models of social utility and reciprocity, even when combined with erroneous decision making. Our data suggests that subjects fail to foresee their opponent's decision even for one step in our simple bargaining games. We consider models of bounded rational decision making such as rules of thumb as explanations for the observed behavioral pattern.

Bounded Rationality in Bargaining Games: Do Proposers Believe That Responders Reject an Equal Split?

Communication, reputation, and punishment in simple sequential bargaining experiments

Jeannette Brosig, Joachim Weimann and Chun-Lei Yang
2004. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 160, 576-606.


The Third-Generation (UMTS) Spectrum License Auction in Germany

Veronika Grimm, Frank Riedel and Elmar Wolfstetter
2004. In: Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunication, G. Illing (ed.), MIT Press.

The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed events during the crucial phase of that auction, which have puzzled several observers. In addition, the paper evaluates the merit of the German UMTS auction design, relative to the English design, that was predominantly employed in Europe.

The Third-Generation (UMTS) Spectrum License Auction in Germany

Market Power in the German Wholesale Electricity

Felix Müsgens
2004. EWI Working Paper 04/3.

This paper quantifies the degree of market power in the German wholesale electricity market. A fundamental model is used to derive competitive marginal cost estimators which are compared with observed electricity prices. Marginal costs are calculated focusing on market fundamentals such as plant capacities, fuel prices, and load structures. In addition, international power exchange and dynamic effects like start-up costs and hydro storage plant dispatch are incorporated. The comparison of marginal costs and prices reveals significant market power in the German electricity market, mainly exhibited during peak periods. Producer surplus is significantly increased by market power.

Market Power in the German Wholesale Electricity

Modernization of local energy systems

Dietmar Lindenberger, Thomas Bruckner, Robbie Morrison, Helmuth-Michael Groscurth and Reiner Kümmel
2004. Energy - The International Journal, 29(2), 245-256.


Die Produktionsmächtigkeit der Energie und die Nutzungspreise von Energie und Arbeit

Reiner Kümmel, Dietmar Lindenberger und Wolfgang Eichhorn
2004. In: Wettbewerb, Wirtschaftsordnung und Umwelt. Schriften zur Politischen Ökonomik, O. Budzinski et al (eds.), 3, 297-310.

Soziale Präferenzen und Cheap Talk - Der Einfluss von Kommunikation

Nadja Trhal
2004. Diplomarbeit, Universität Bonn.


An experimental test of the public-goods crowding-out hypothesis when taxation is endogenous

Matthias Sutter and Hannelore Weck-Hannemann
2004. Finanzarchiv, 60, 94-110.

Andreoni (1993) has shown in an experimental study that crowding-out is incomplete when an involuntary lump-sum tax is levied exogenously on individuals to finance the provision of a public good. In this paper, we (i) replicate Andreoni's experimental conditions, (ii) introduce treatments where subjects vote on a tax, which is (iii) either below or above the Nash equilibrium. We find almost complete crowding-out with exogenous taxation. Voting behavior on the tax in the endogenous treatment has high predictive power for voluntary contributions, but only when voting on the tax which is below the Nash equilibrium of the game.

Favoritism of agents - The case of referees' home bias

Matthias Sutter and Martin Kocher
2004. Journal of Economic Psychology, 25, 461-469.

We study the behavior of football (soccer) referees in the German Bundesliga. Referees are requested to act as impartial agents. However, they may allocate benefits and rewards in a biased way. Agency theory has long neglected this possible form of malfeasance of economic agents, but has rather concentrated on agents exerting suboptimal effort levels. Favoritism or biased behavior of referees can be investigated by examining their decisions on awarding penalties or extra time at the end of a football match. We can confirm a systematic home bias of referees.

Measuring efficiency of German football teams by Data Envelopment Analysis

Dieter Haas, Martin Kocher and Matthias Sutter
2004. Central European Journal of Operations Research, 12, 251-268.

We study the efficiency of football teams in the 1999/2000 season of the German Bundesliga by Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Our input variables are wage bills, separately for players and coaches. Output is measured by points awarded, total revenues and average stadium utilization. Efficiency scores in our empirical results are not correlated with rank in the league and that medium- and small-sized teams like SC Freiburg often outperform well-known teams like Borussia Dortmund. We decompose the sources of inefficiency into technical inefficiency and scale inefficiency and test for the sensitivity of results with respect to different input-output combinations.

Measuring the economic and ecological performance of OECD countries

Dietmar Lindenberger
2004. EWI-Working Paper.

The economic and ecological performance of OECD countries over two decades is measured by employing a Malmquist-Luenberger productivity index. The index credits the expansion of goods (value added) and the contraction of bads (emissions), at given inputs. We consider the inputs of capital, labor, and energy, and the emissions of CO2, So2, and NOx. The calculated indices are decomposed into measures of efficiency change (catching up) and technical change (innovation). We analyse the variation of the results depending on the assumed returns to scale and dimensionality. Our findings suggest to employ aggregate analyses of productivity to identify crucial dimensions, which may then be analysed on a more disaggregated basis.

Measuring the economic and ecological performance of OECD countries

Patterns of co-authorship among economics departments in the U.S

Matthias Sutter and Martin Kocher
2004. Applied Economics, 36, 327-333.

Given the steady increase of co-authored papers in economics journals, we study the patterns of co-authorship between U.S. universities and colleges. A majority of institutions produces more co-authored than single-authored papers. Contacts with researchers from the same institution are still an important source of co-authored papers, even though slightly decreasing in frequency. We test the determinants of co-authorship outside the own institution in a gravity model and find that distance and other geographical variables do not matter. However, the quality of co-authors' institutions, measured by rankings of institutions, has a significant impact on the number of co-authored papers in top economics journals.