Pre-published online by De Gruyter on July 1, 2021.
Schlüsselwörter: Marktdesign, Marktversagen, Impfstoffproduktion, COVID-19, Pandemie-Management, Kooperation
Zusammenfassung: Manche Märkte erlauben es auf sich alleine gestellt nicht, robuste Krisenvorsorge zu treffen. Der Markt für Impfstoffe gehört dazu. Der Preismechanismus versagt besonders in der Krise, wenn beide Marktseiten große Marktmacht besitzen. Daher muss interveniert werden, um die Impfstoffproduktion zuverlässiger zu machen. Axel Ockenfels entwickelt ein hybrides Marktdesign, das auf Kapazitätspreise und Leistungspreise setzt, um den systemischen Herausforderungen einer globalen Krisensituation mit ihren politischen, ökonomischen und sozialen Verwerfungen zu begegnen. Das hybride Modell erlaubt einen gleitenden Übergang von normalen Zeiten in den Krisenmodus–und wieder zurück.
Sandro Ambuehl, B. Douglas Bernheim and Axel Ockenfels
2021. American Economic Review, 111(3), 787-830.
Keywords: Paternalism, libertarianism, welfare economics, experiment, false consensus bias.
Abstract: We study experimentally when, why, and how people intervene in others’ choices. Choice Architects (CAs) construct opportunity sets containing bundles of time-indexed payments for Choosers. CAs frequently prevent impatient choices despite opportunities to provide advice, believing Choosers benefit. They violate common behavioral welfare criteria by removing impatient options even when all payoffs are delayed. CAs intervene not by removing options they wish they could resist when choosing for themselves (mistakes-projective paternalism), but rather as if they seek to align others’ choices with their own aspirations (ideals-projective paternalism). Laboratory choices predict subjects’ support for actual paternalistic policies.
Viola Ackfeld and Axel Ockenfels
2021. Games and Ecoomic Behavior, 128, 58-72.
Keywords: Charity experiment, prosocial behavior, autonomy, bans, incentives.
Abstract: We experimentally investigate people's willingness to intervene in others' decision-making in order to promote a charitable donation. We find that only a minority of those subjects who would donate themselves enforce the donation by banning the selfish choice from the decision-maker's choice menu. Bans are more acceptable if they are implemented only after the decision-makers could choose between the selfish and the prosocial option themselves. Also, many subjects decide against offering decision-makers a monetary incentive to switch from the selfish to the prosocial choice. We discuss potential hypotheses about underlying motivations for the (non-)usage of interventions, with a special focus on the hypothesis that interventions to promote prosocial choice are more acceptable the more they respect the autonomy of others.
Negotiating climate cooperation
Axel Ockenfels and Klaus Schmidt
2020. Working paper.
International climate cooperation needs to be negotiated among sovereign countries. The key to cooperation, and to countervail free riding, is reciprocity. Using game theory and a human subject experiment, we show that reciprocity can be built into the negotiation design. Human players negotiating a reciprocal common commitment are substantially more successful in promoting cooperation than when negotiating individual commitments. Moreover, focusing on a uniform common commitment strongly facilitates agreement, as compared to negotiating a vector of commitments, one for each player. Because a carbon price is a natural candidate for a uniform common commitment, our findings suggest that international climate negotiations should focus on reciprocal carbon pricing. Economists advocate carbon pricing for its cost efficiency, yet the role of carbon pricing for promoting cooperation could be at least as important.
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Keywords: Aversion to incentives, information, repugnance, charity experiment.
Abstract: In this paper, I study an aversion to monetary incentives to make other people change their behavior. Particularly, I provide evidence that monetary incentives are disliked because they are powerful in changing what people do but not why they do it besides for money. In an experiment, one group of participants decides about interventions which try to change others' behavior. Between treatments, I vary whether the intervention consists of convincing information or monetary incentives. I find that participants consider monetary incentives as more effective in changing behavior than informative interventions. Nonetheless, they are less willing to intervene by monetary incentives compared to informative interventions to foster their preferred outcome. A comprehensive set of elicited beliefs supports the idea that this aversion to incentives stems from incentives' lack of changing one's reason to act.
Ottmar Edenhofer, Matthias Kalkuhl und Axel Ockenfels
2020. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.
Keywords: Klimaschutzgesetz, CO2-Preis, Emissionshandel, internationale Kooperation, Klimawandel, Klimapolitik, EU, Deutschland.
Abstract: Das Klimaschutzgesetz hat einen Paradigmenwechsel eingeleitet: den Einstieg in eine CO2-Bepreisung als künftiges Leitinstrument der Klimapolitik. Auf den ersten Blick ist der CO2-Preis unter einer Fülle von Fördermaßnahmen und ordnungsrechtlichen Regelungen verschüttet, deren Wirksamkeit und Kosten höchst unsicher sind. Der CO2-Preis ist aber so angelegt, dass er langfristig das dominante Instrument einer europäisch harmonisierten Klimapolitik werden kann. Der angedeutete Paradigmenwechsel der deutschen Klimapolitik öffnet damit die Tür, die europäische und internationale Kooperation zu stärken. Dazu ist es aber notwendig, neben der europäischen auch die globale Klimapolitik neu auszurichten. Auch dort sollten sich die Verhandlungen statt auf nationale Mengenziele auf CO2-Preise konzentrieren. Die erforderliche Kooperation wird möglich, wenn die Regierungen Transferzahlungen strategisch und reziprok nutzen. So könnte die Effektivität der Klimapolitik erhöht werden und es ließen sich die entstehenden Verteilungskonflikte entschärfen.
Bringing the efficiency of electricity market mechanisms to multimodal mobility across congested transportation systems
Arash Beheshtian, R.Richard Geddes, Omid M.Rouhani, Kara M. Kockelman, Axel Ockenfels, Peter Cramton and Wooseok Do
2020. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 131, 58-69.
Keywords: Mobility as a service, market design, congestion pricing.
Abstract: A central challenge facing Mobility as a Service (MaaS) is mispricing of its a core input: the use of scarce road space. A transparent real-time market for road use is essential for MaaS to reach its full potential. We focus on how network-wide, real-time markets for road use support MaaS, and how such markets can be developed.
In our proposed network-management scheme, roadway tolls (for entire trips – from origin to destination) are determined in a two-stage market hosted by an independent system operator or “ISO”. Service providers purchase the product (the right to use a series of road segments at a reasonably specific time of day) in the day-ahead market. In real-time, the market becomes physical and operates under the principle of open access: road capacity cannot be withheld in real time and its use is determined by users’ decisions, guided by prices and suggested routings. Real-time road-use prices are computed using clearing prices that balance real-time supply and demand. Those with pre-paid slots can be paid to delay their travel, to create space for high bidders during periods of suddenly low capacity or unexpectedly high demand. Such policies and programs can avoid excessive congestion, provide reliable travel times, and keep traffic moving, especially as automation makes car and truck travel easier.
Such policies are critical in helping cities and regions avoid gridlock. They ensure that travelers internalize congestion externalities, while enabling MaaS and other transport providers to deliver higher-quality mobility service for all travelers. Thoughtful marriage of week-ahead, day-ahead and real-time road pricing for travelers on congested networks can deliver efficient transportation systems that save time and energy, while providing signals for optimal infrastructure investment.
Sandro Ambuehl, Axel Ockenfels and Colin Stewart
2020. Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 3154197.
Keywords: Rational inattention, incentives, risk preferences, selection effects, cognitive ability.
Abstract: Payments and discounts incentivize participation in many transactions about which people know little, but can learn more — payments for medical trial participation, signing bonuses for job applicants, or price rebates on consumer durables. Who opts into the transaction when given such incentives? We show theoretically and experimentally that increasing participation payments disproportionately attracts individuals for whom learning about the transaction is harder. These participants decide based on worse information and are more likely to regret their decision ex post. The learning-based selection effect is stronger when information acquisition is more costly. Moreover, it outweighs selection on risk preferences in many of our treatments.
Gary E. Bolton, Johannes Mans and Axel Ockenfels
2020. The Economic Jurnal, 130(629), 1248–1261.
Keywords: Laboratory, individual behavior, market structure, pricing and design.
Abstract: The provision of trader feedback is critical to the functioning of many markets. We examine the influence of group identity on the volunteering and informativeness of feedback. In a market experiment conducted simultaneously in Germany and the United States, we manipulate the interaction of traders based on natural social and induced home market identities. Traders are more likely to provide feedback information on a trader with whom they share a common group identity, and the effect is more pronounced for social identity than for home market identity. Both kinds of group identity promote rewarding good performance and punishing bad performance.
Peter Cramton, Axel Ockenfels, Alvin E. Roth and Robert B. Wilson
2020. Nature, 582, 334-336.
z-Tree unleashed: A novel client-integrating architecture for conducting z-Tree experiments over the Internet
Matthias L. Duch, Max R. P. Grossmann and Thomas Lauer
2020. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 28(100400).
Abstract: We present z-Tree unleashed, a novel approach and set of scripts to aid the implementation of computerized behavioral experiments outside the laboratory. z-Tree unleashed enables subjects to join the experiment using a web portal that requires no software apart from a web browser. Experimenters are likewise enabled to administer their experiments from anywhere in the world. Except for z-Tree itself, z-Tree unleashed is entirely based on free and open-source software. In this paper we give a high-level overview of z-Tree unleashed's features and benefits and its design. We also show how to set up the server and demonstrate the steps required for conducting an entire experiment. We subsequently explain how to leverage the security and routing features of a virtual private network with z-Tree unleashed, enabling servers to securely run behind routers.
Dorothea Kübler und Axel Ockenfels
2020. Medizinrecht, 38, 89-94.
(Basiert auf Stellungnahme zum Antrag „Chancen von altruistischen Organlebendspenden nutzen – Spenden erleichtern“, Sachverständigengutachten für den Ausschuss für Gesundheit des Deutschen Bundestags.)
Abstract: Lebendspenden werden in Deutschland sehr viel seltener ermöglicht als in anderen Ländern. Das liegt auch daran, dass Überkreuzspenden nicht erlaubt sind. Spender und Empfänger müssen sich „in besonderer persönlicher Ver- bundenheit offenkundig nahestehen.“ Die Organe poten- zieller Nierenspender mit dem geforderten Näheverhältnis zum Empfänger sind allerdings aufgrund von Unverträg- lichkeiten in etwa 40 % der Fälle nicht kompatibel mit den jeweiligen Empfängern. Die Überkreuzspende bringt zwei Paare zusammen, bestehend aus jeweils einem Patienten und einem nahestehenden Spender, um eine Organspen- de ‚über Kreuz‘ zu ermöglichen. Aus der Praxis der Über- kreuzspende in anderen Ländern lassen sich Best Practices ableiten.
Axel Ockenfels and Uta Schier
2020. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 172, 97-106.
Keywords: Framing, trust game, stag-hunt game, incentives, mindsets.
Abstract: We show that economic games per se can provide contextual cues and thereby impact behavior. In two laboratory experiments, we examine whether deliberating on trust games versus stag-hunt games without feedback changes cooperation behavior in a subsequent game. First, we find that subjects who play trust games without feedback hold more pessimistic beliefs about other players’ cooperation in a subsequent game than subjects who played stag-hunt games without feedback. We also observe that deliberation on trust games versus stag-hunt games accordingly affects behavior in a subsequent, unrelated game. While stag-hunt games align interests between players, trust games pose a conflict of interest between players. Such (mis-)alignments induced by the game potentially explain our findings, because they may offer cues that affect beliefs and behavior in subsequent games.
Alexa Weiss, Corinna Michels, Pascal Burgmer, Thomas Mussweiler, Axel Ockenfels and Wilhelm Hofmann
2020. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Advance online publication.
Keywords: trust, distrust, experience sampling, cooperation, interdependence.
Abstract: Although trust plays a pivotal role in many aspects of life, very little is known about the manifestation of trust and distrust in everyday life. In this work, we integrated several prior approaches to trust and investigated the prevalence and key determinants of trust (vs. distrust) in people’s natural environments, using preregistered experience-sampling methodology. Across more than 4,500 social interactions from a heterogeneous sample of 427 participants, results showed high average levels of trust, but also considerable variability in trust across contexts. This variability was attributable to aspects of trustee perception, social distance, as well as 3 key dimensions of situational interdependence: conflict of interests, information (un)certainty, and power imbalance. At the dispositional level, average everyday trust was shaped by general trust, moral identity, and zero-sum beliefs. The social scope of most trust-related traits, however, was moderated by social distance: Whereas moral identity buffered against distrusting distant targets, high general distrust and low social value orientation amplified trust differences between close vs. distant others. Furthermore, a laboratory-based trust game predicted everyday trust only with regard to more distant but not close interaction partners. Finally, everyday trust was linked to self-disclosure and to cooperation, particularly in situations of high conflict between interaction partners’ interests. We conclude that trust can be conceptualized as a relational hub that interconnects the social perception of the trustee, the relational closeness between trustor and trustee, key structural features of situational interdependence, and behavioral response options such as self-disclosure.
Eric M. Aldrich, Hasan Ali Demirci and Kristian López Vargas
2019. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 25(100205).
Keywords: Market design, experimental finance, algorithmic trading, laboratory experiments, economic software.
Abstract: This document presents an architecture for experiments in finance. The architecture builds on oTree, a modern platform for behavioral experiments, allowing for sophisticated economic environments, market institutions, and trader strategies. The system supports both continuous-and discrete-time markets, and allows for communication latencies at time resolutions of 10–20 ms. Such precise communication latencies facilitate the experimental study of high-frequency trading. The architecture also modularizes its main components, which makes the system flexible, portable, and scalable.
Axel Ockenfels und Christoph M. Schmidt
2019. Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 68(2), 122-130.
Abstract: The discussion of climate policy received new impetus in the spring of 2019. Since then the topic has dominated the public discourse in Germany. The Fridays for Future movement continues to generate considerable pressure on policy makers. In addition, scientists emphasize in rare interdisciplinary unanimity both how urgent a radical renewal in climate policy would be, and that a uniform price for greenhouse gas emissions is the indispensable core element of the necessary reforms in Germany and Europe. One central aspect of climate policy is, however, often overlooked in all this: climate protection is essentially an international problem of cooperation. For climate change, it does not matter where greenhouse gases are emitted. The success of national climate policy must therefore be judged by whether it contributes to establishing international cooperation to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions.
Direct pricing accommodates moral behavior
Axel Ockenfels, Peter Werner and Ottmar Edenhofer
2019. Working paper.
Abstract: To measure how moral behavior interacts with pricing regimes, we conduct highly controlled experiments in which trading creates pollution. We compare indirect pricing (a cap-and-trade mechanism in our experiment) and direct pricing (a tax) in an otherwise equivalent setting in which ‘producers’ are incentivized to emit CO2. ‘Judges’ decide on central trading parameters that may restrict socially harmful activities. Profit-maximization predicts the same producer behavior, not affected by CO2 externalities. Yet, we find a significant share of producers refraining from emitting CO2 at all. Even though judges restrict behavior in similar ways across mechanisms, direct pricing is more effective to accommodate moral behavior than capping pollution.
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Eric M. Aldrich and Kristian López Vargas
2019. Experimental Economics, 23, 322-352.
Keywords: Market design, auctions, high-frequency trading, continuous double auction, frequent batch auction.
Abstract: We implement a laboratory financial market where traders can access costly technology that reduces communication latency with a remote exchange. In this environment, we conduct a market design study on high-frequency trading: we contrast the performance of the newly proposed frequent batch auction (FBA) against the continuous double auction (CDA), which organizes trades in most exchanges worldwide. Our evidence suggests that, relative to the CDA, the FBA exhibits (1) less predatory trading behavior, (2) lower investments in low-latency communication technology, (3) lower transaction costs, and (4) lower volatility in market spreads and liquidity. We also find that transitory shocks in the environment have substantially greater impact on market dynamics in the CDA than in the FBA.
Yan Chen, Peter Crampton, John A. List and Axel Ockenfels
2019. Working paper.
Keywords: Market design, human behavior, management.
Abstract: We review past research and forecast future directions on how the rapidly growing areas of market design and behavioral economics have influenced and will continue to impact the science and practice of management in both the private and public sectors. Using examples from various auction markets, reputation and feedback system design in online markets, matching market design in education, and the design of labor markets, we demonstrate that combining market design theory, behavioral insights, and experimental methods can lead to fruitful implementation of superior mechanisms in practice.
Peter Cramton, R. Richard Geddes and Axel Ockenfels
2019. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 175(1), 126-139.
Keywords: Congestion pricing, dynamic road pricing, transport market design.
Abstract: Traffic congestion is a pervasive worldwide problem. We explain how to harness existing technologies together with new methods in time-and-location markets to eradicate traffic congestion along with its attendant social harms. Our marketdesign for road use builds on congestion pricing and models of efficient pricing in the electricity sector. The market maximizes the value of a transport network through efficient scheduling, routing, and pricing of road use. Privacy and equity concerns are addressed. Transparent price information provides essential infor-mation for efficient long-term investment in transport.
Viola Ackfeld and Werner Güth
2019. Working paper.
Keywords: Personal information disclosure, incentives, social pressure, experiment.
Abstract: Personal information is shared extensively every day, partly in exchange for benefits or as a reaction to other people’s information sharing. In this paper, we experimentally in- vestigate these two motives by analyzing the interaction of peer comparison and incentives to disclose potentially privacy-sensitive information. We find that information sharing is higher under incentives, and further increases under peer comparison. This effect is driven by those initially disclosing less, who additionally report to feel more compelled to reveal information. Our results provide an explanation for the current information sharing trend while pointing to a potentially neglected side effect.
Peter Cramton, R. Richard Geddes and Axel Ockenfels
2018. Nature (Comment), 560, 23-25.
Abstract: Track vehicles to link tolls with demand and cut congestion, urge Peter Cramton, R. Richard Geddes and Axel Ockenfels.
Eric M. Aldrich and Daniel Friedman
2018. Working Paper.
Keywords: Market design, high-frequency trading, continuous double auction, IEX, labexperiments.
Abstract: Several financial exchanges recently introduced messaging delays (e.g., the 350 microseconddelay at IEX and NYSE American) to protect ordinary investors from high-frequency traderswho exploit stale orders. To capture the impact of such delays, we propose a simple parametricmodel of the continuous double auction market format. The model features a discrete pricegrid and pegged orders, and is solved in closed form. It shows how messaging delay can in-deed lower transactions costs but typically increases queuing costs. Some of the model’s manycomparative static predictions are testable in the field and others are testable in a laboratory environment.