Im Rahmen des C-SEB Early Ideas Workshop stellt Melisa Kurtis ihre aktuellen Forschungsergebnisse vor.

Abstract:

The design of optimal insurance contracts is dependent on the predicted behavior of potential customers. In order to predict this behavior and design an offer of contracts, insurers must have knowledge of the composition of risk preferences among their potential customers. However, while behavior and decisions can be observed from empirical data, underlying preferences are not directly observable. In a laboratory experiment, we aim to elicit risk preferences underlying insurance decisions from insurance contract choices and to verify that non-expected utility preferences, as postulated in recent theoretical work on optimal insurance mechanisms, are an accurate assumption. Additionally, we investigate the generalizability of risk preferences elicited in a lottery setting to the insurance domain and provide a test bed for evaluating the robustness of optimal insurance design models in an experimental setting.

Zoomlink: https://uni-koeln.zoom.us/j/94558809915?pwd=NmVwc3haRk52VU5TZk4yNnF3YVFudz09

or use the meeting ID 945 5880 9915 and the password EIW21.