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The Virtual Laboratory Infrastructure for Controlled Online Economic Experiments

Ben Greiner, H.-Arno Jacobsen and Carsten Schmidt
2002. In: Kurt Kremer, Volker Macho (Hrsg.): Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen: Beiträge zum Heinz-Billing-Preis. GWDG Bericht 62, 59-73



The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior and Artificial Agents

Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth
2002. Artificial Intelligence Magazine, 23(3): 79-87



Automated Bandtwidth Exchange

Veronika Grimm and Björn Rupp
2002. Working Paper



Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet

Alvin E. Roth and Axel Ockenfels
2002. American Economic Review, 92(4): 1093-1103



Perspektiven der Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung im Europäischen Strommarkt

Dietmar Lindenberger and Michael Bartels
2002. In: Tagungsband des 7. Dresdner Fernwärme- Kolloquiums, Dresden



Three Essays on Mechanism Design and Multi-Object Auctions

Veronika Grimm
2002. Aachen, Shaker Verlag



Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner's dilemma game

Jeannette Brosig
2002. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 47, 275-290



Uniform Price Auction vs. Fixed Price Mechanisms: A Numerical Analysis

Jürgen Bierbaum and Veronika Grimm
2002. Working Paper



Ausbaupotenziale der Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung und der Fernwärme im europäischen Strommarkt

Dietmar Lindenberger and Walter Schulz
2002. In: Forschung und Entwicklung, Mitteilungen der Forschungsstelle und des Forschungsbeirates der AGFW, 7, 123-136



Public bad prevention by majority voting on redistribution - Experimental evidence

Matthias Sutter
2002. Group Decision and Negotiation 11, 415-428

We present an experimental study on voting behavior in groups of seven persons where public bad prevention depends on redistributing income by qualified majority voting. Although a payoff-maximizing voting pattern exists which guarantees a qualified majority - thus maximizing both individual and group payoffs - the qualified majority is failed in 27% (relatively costly public bad), respectively 46% (relatively cheap public bad) of all decisions. Controlling for different degrees of social distance when casting votes (i.e. anonymous versus with identification) we find that social distance matters when stakes are relatively low, inducing less efficient outcomes for the group when voting behavior is revealed. The endogenously determined status of subjects with respect to redistribution ('unlucky subjects' lose, 'lucky subjects' win) systematically influences subjects' voting strategies and the collective outcomes, such that a higher number of unlucky subjects leads to less efficient outcomes for the group.



Capital, labor, energy and creativity: modeling innovation diffusion

Reiner Kümmel, Julian Henn and Dietmar Lindenberger
2002. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics (13/4), 415-433



Representation and educational background of European economists in top journals of economics

Matthias Sutter, Martin Kocher, and Robert Mrsic
2002. Empirica 29, 275-288

We assess the contribution of European authors to 10 top journals of economics from 1980 to 1998. Despite efforts on the European Union and national levels to promote academic excellence, European authors still play a minor role in top journals. Examining the development over time we find little evidence for an increasing share of European contributions. Particular attention has been paid to the educational background of European authors. There is still a segmentation of academic education along language barriers in continental Europe. However, a considerable proportion of European authors has received a Ph.D. from the US.



Lack of standardization in informetric research: Reply

Martin Kocher, and Matthias Sutter
2002. Scientometrics 55, 329-331

Lack of standardization in informetric research: Reply



Energy-dependent production functions and the optimization model PRISE of Price-Induced Sectoral Evolution

Dietmar Lindenberger and Reiner Kümmel
2002. International Journal of Applied Thermodynamics, 5(3), 101-107
In an attempt to integrate thermodynamics with economics, production functions are proposed that depend on capital, labor, and energy, and technological parameters associated with the energy conversion efficiency of the capital stock. Based on these production functions, which resolve most of the unexplained Solow residual of conventional economic growth theory, we develop the optimization model PRISE of PRice-Induced Sectoral Evolution. The model is designed to analyse potential changes of inputs, outputs, and profits in differently energy- and labor-intensive sectors of an economy in response to changing factor prices. It is tested empirically by considering the German sectoral economic evolution 1968-1989.



Experimental 'Beauty Contests' with homogeneous and heterogeneous players and with interior and boundary equilibria

Werner Güth, Martin Kocher, and Matthias Sutter
2002. Economics Letters 74, 219-228

We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior equilibria and homogeneous players.