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Großhandelsmärkte für Strom - Marktintegration und Wettbewerb aus deutscher Perspektive

Nitsche, Rainer, Axel Ockenfels, Lars-Hendrik Röller und Lars Wiethaus
Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, Vol. 60, No. 3, 2010, 28-37.

Nicht selten hört man besorgte Stimmen und kritische Äußerungen über die fehlende Integration der europäischen Großhandelsmärkte für Strom und die Marktbeherrschung durch nationale Stromversorger. Hervorzuheben ist in diesem Zusammenhang die Branchenuntersuchung (Sector Inquiry (SI)) der Europäischen Kommission, die für die Jahre 2002 bis 2005 entsprechende Bedenken äußert. Vor diesem Hintergrund haben die Autoren die Entwicklung und den Stand der europäischen Marktintegration untersucht. Zusätzlich wurde das Projektteam um eine Beurteilung gebeten, ob das Niveau der deutschen Großhandelspreise für Strom oberhalb der Preisbildung läge, die sich bei funktionierenden Wettbewerbsmärkten einstellen würde.


    Wage Transparency and Performance: A Real-Effort Experiment.

    Greiner, Ben, Axel Ockenfels, and Peter Werner
    University of Cologne, Working Paper Series in Economics, 2010, No. 48.

    We study the effect of wage changes on performance under varying contract schemes in a real-effort experiment. Without transparency about peer wages, an increase or decrease of wages does not affect performance. With transparency about peer wages, higher paid workers tend to work more accurately, and lower paid workers shirk more if wages are piece rate rather than flat.


    Testing and Modeling Fairness Motives.

    Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels
    In: Perspectives in Moral Sciences, Contributions from Philosophy, Economics, and Politics in Honour of Hartmut Kliemt, eds. Michael Bourmann and Bernd Lahno, Frankfurt: Frankfurt School Verlag, 2009, 199 – 206.




      Probleme von Strompreiskontrollen aus volkswirtschaftlicher Sicht

      Axel Ockenfels
      In: Bonner Gespräch zum Energierecht, 4, ed. Wolfgang Löwer. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009, 25-42.

      Strompreise steigen in den letzten Jahren auf immer neue Rekordhöhen - die Hoffnung auf fallende Strompreise nach Entlassung der Stromerzeuger in den Wettbewerb Ende der 90er Jahre hat sich nicht erfüllt...


        Die Ökonomik nichtlinearer Tarife am Beispiel Bahnstrom.

        Axel Ockenfels
        Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, 4/2009, 306-315

        Nichtlineare Tarife, wie z.B. Mengen- und Laufzeitrabatte, sind in Infrastrukturindustrien weit verbreitet...


          Vom Labor ins Feld: Die Ökonomik des Vertrauens

          Greiner, Ben, and Axel Ockenfels
          In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, ed. Jens Becker and Christoph Deutschmann, Köln, 2009, Sonderheft 49, 219-242

          Gegeben wird ein selektiver Überblick über jüngere Fortschritte der ökonomischen Laborforschung zu Vertrauen.


            The Limits of Trust

            Bolton, Gary E., and Axel Ockenfels
            In: eTrust, eds. K. Cook, C. Snijders, and V. Buskens. New York: Russell Sage, 2009, 15-36




              Design von Reputationssystemen auf Basis von Spieltheorie und Experimenteller Wirtschaftsforschung

              Ockenfels, Axel und Alexander Rajko
              In: GI-Edition Lecture Notes in Informatics(LNI): P-154, 2009, S.3494-3501

              Reputationssysteme helfen Vertrauen in elektronischen Märkten zu etablieren und dabei die Handelseffizienz zu steigern. Die Implementierung solcher Systeme vereint informationstechnische und ökonomische Aspekte. Wir zeigen mit Hilfe experimenteller Studien auf Basis eines einfachen spieltheoretischen Modells, wie das Design von Reputationssystemen verstanden und verbessert werden kann.


                Learning to Bid in Markets with Reputation Information

                Greiner, Ben, Felix Lamouroux and Axel Ockenfels
                In: Wolfgang Franz, Werner Güth, Hans J. Ramser, und Manfred Stadler (Hrsg.): Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Seminar Ottobeuren, Band 38 (Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung), Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen, 2009.

                In den letzten Jahren ist mit der Entwicklung des Internets ein wichtiger und stark wachsender Forschungszweig hinzugekommen - das Design elektronischer Märkte...


                  Heterogeneity and Partnership Dissolution Mechanisms: Theory and Lab Evidence

                  Kittsteiner, Thomas, Axel Ockenfels, and Nadja Trhal
                  working paper, 3 September 2009

                  We theoretically and experimentally compare two partnership dissolution mechanisms, the buy-sell clause and the winner’s bid auction, in an independent private value environment. While simple standard theory predicts that the auction outperforms the buy-sell clause with respect to efficiency, the buy-sell clause is the predominant mechanism applied in practice. We prove that, if partners are heterogeneous with respect to risk aversion, the buy-sell clause may outperform the auction. Partners in the experiment exhibit very heterogeneous willingness to take risks, resulting in a (weak) efficiency advantage of the buy-sell clause.


                  Die Kunst des Marktdesigns

                  Axel Ockenfels
                  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14.08.2009: 10

                  Um den Vorwurf zu kontern, ihre Forschung habe mit der Praxis wenig zu tun, gehen Ökonomen ins Labor. Dort testen sie Marktmodelle und Anreize im Experiment. Die Fortschritte sind enorm und von praktischer Bedeutung...


                  Rational und Fair

                  Ockenfels, Axel, and Werner Raub
                  forthcoming in Gert Albert und Steffen Sigmund (eds.): Soziologische Theorie kontrovers, Sonderheft 50, 2010, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie.




                  Risk Taking and Social Comparison. A Comment on "Betrayal Aversion: Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States"

                  Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels
                  In: American Economic Review, forthcoming. [was: University of Cologne, Working Paper Series in Economics, 2008, No. 40.

                  There is a growing literature showing that social context and social comparison can significantly affect consumption patterns, labor supply, savings, bargaining, cooperation, competition and other kinds of economic behavior. Surprisingly few contributions, however, investigate risk taking in a social context.


                  Marktdesign und Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung

                  Axel Ockenfels
                  In: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2009, 10 (Special Issue), 31-53

                  Economic engineering is the science of designing real-world institutions and mechanisms that align individual incentives and behavior with the underlying goals. Institutions matter because they affect incentives, and decision makers respond to incentives. Yet, they do not always do so rationally. Experimental economics complements economic theory by observing the performance of mechanisms in the context of actual decision processes faced by real people. It also answers questions that cannot be answered by theory and field data, tests hypotheses and identifies causalities suggested by theory and field observations, collects facts and phenomena that may stimulate behavioral theories of market design, eases cross-disciplinary cooperation, and communicates economic research to market participants, managers and other real-world decision makers. This article presents selected examples to illustrate how experimental economics may interplay with the more traditional economic toolbox to promote economic engineering both in research and in practice.


                    Engineering Trust - Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information

                    Gary Bolton, Ben Greiner, and Axel Ockenfels
                    working paper, 2009

                    Reciprocal feedback distorts the production and content of reputation information, hampering trust and trade efficiency. Data from eBay and other sources combined with laboratory data provide a robust picture of how reciprocity can be guided by changes in the way feedback information flows through the system, leading to more accurate reputation information, more trust and more efficient trade.


                    Auktionsdesign für Emissionsberechtigungen

                    Axel Ockenfels
                    In: Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft 02/2009, 105-114

                    From an economic perspective, auctions are an appropriate mechanism for the initial allocation of emission allowances, because they tend to be advantageous with respect to distributional and efficiency goals. Different auction designs can lead to different outcomes...


                    Strommarktdesign: Zur Ausgestaltung der Auktionsregeln an der EEX

                    Grimm, Veronika, Axel Ockenfels and Gregor Zoettl
                    Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, Vol. 32, No 3, 2008, 147-161

                    Strommarktdesign: Zur Ausgestaltung der Auktionsregeln an der EEX Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit dem Design von Stromauktionen in einer börsenbasierten Marktstruktur. Wir analysieren verschiedene Preisbildungsregeln und diskutieren, inwieweit in Stromauktionen komplementäre Kostenbestandteile durch spezielle Gebotsformate berücksichtigt werden sollten. Wir analysieren außerdem verschiedene Rahmenbedingungen des Stromhandels aus Marktdesignsicht, insbesondere die Kopplung bisher unabhängig operierender Strommärkte sowie die Transparenz des Stromhandels.


                      Ein Vergleich ausgewählter europäischer Strombörsen

                      Grimm, Veronika, Axel Ockenfels and Gregor Zoettl
                      Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2008, 162-170

                      Ein Vergleich ausgewählter europäischer Strombörsen. Dieser Beitrag stellt die Regelwerke ausgewählter europäischer Stromauktionen vor und vergleicht ihre institutionelle Ausgestaltung. Die Auktionen verwenden zumeist dieselbe Preisbildungsregel, unterscheiden sich jedoch hinsichtlich der möglichen Gebotsformate und des Grades der internationalen Koordination. Ein Vergleich der Märkte bringt Einsichten für ein effektives Strommarktdesign.


                        Neun Beobachtungen zur Preisbildung im liberalisierten Strommarkt: Darf man seiner Intuition vertrauen?

                        Axel Ockenfels
                        In: Bonner Gespräch zum Energierecht, 3, ed. Wolfgang Löwer. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 9-29, 2008.




                          The Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is there a Neeskens-Effect?

                          Wolfgang Leininger and Axel Ockenfels
                          In: Patric Andersson, Peter Ayton, Carsten Schmidt (Eds.), Myths and Facts about Football: The Economics and Psychology of the World's Greatest Sport. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008, 73-92




                          Does Competition Promote Trust and Trustworthiness in Online Trading? An Experimental Study

                          Gary Bolton, Claudia Loebbecke, and Axel Ockenfels
                          Journal of Management Information Systems, 25(2), 2008, 145-169

                          Many Internet markets rely on feedback systems, essentially social networks of reputation, to facilitate trust and trustworthiness in anonymous transactions. Market competition creates incentives that arguably may enhance or curb the effectiveness of these systems. We investigate how different forms of market competition and social reputation networks interact in a series of laboratory online markets, where sellers face a moral hazard. We find that competition in strangers networks (where market encounters are one-shot) most frequently enhances trust and trustworthiness, and always increases total gains-from-trade. One reason is that information about reputation trumps pricing in the sense that traders usually do not conduct business with someone having a bad reputation not even for a substantial price discount. We also find that a reliable reputation network can largely reduce the advantage of partners networks (where a buyer and a seller can maintain repeated exchange with each other) in promoting trust and trustworthiness if the market is sufficiently competitive. We conclude that, overall, competitive online markets have more effective social reputation networks.


                          Cooperation in Viscous Populations - Experimental Evidence

                          Veronika Grimm and Friederike Mengel
                          Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.05.005, Online-First Version.

                          We experimentally investigate the effect of population viscosity (an increased probability to interact with others of one’s type or group) on cooperation in a standard prisoners dilemma environment. Subjects can repeatedly choose between two groups, that differ in the defector gain in the associated prisoners dilemma. Choosing into the group with the smaller defector-gain can signal one’s willingness to cooperate. The degree of viscosity is varied across treatments. We find that both, the share of subjects that choose into the ”cooperative” group and the share of subjects that do cooperate, rise sharply with the degree of viscosity. The subjects intrinsic willingness to cooperate is a strictly increasing function of the expected probability that others cooperate if and only if viscosity is high enough.


                          Self-centered Fairness in Games with More than Two Players

                          Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels
                          In: Charlie Plott and Vernon Smith (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results,1,Elsevier: North Holland, 2008, 531-540




                          Testing Theories of Other-regarding Behavior - A Sequence of Four Laboratory Studies

                          Gary E. Bolton, Jordi Brandts, Elena Katok, Axel Ockenfels and Rami Zwick
                          In: Charlie Plott and Vernon Smith (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, 1, Elsevier: North Holland, 488-499, 2008




                          Managers and Students as Newsvendors. How Out-of-Task Experience Matters

                          Gary E. Bolton, Axel Ockenfels and Ulrich Thonemann
                          University of Cologne, Working Paper Series in Economics, 2008, No. 39.

                          We compare how freshmen business students, graduate business students and experienced procurement managers perform on a simple inventory ordering task. We find that, qualitatively, managers exhibit ordering behavior similar to students, including biased ordering towards average demand. Experience, however, affects subjects’ utilization of information. The managers’ work experience seems most valuable when there is only historical demand data to guide decision making, while students better utilize analytical information and task training. As a result, when information necessary to solve the problem to optimality is added to historical information, students catch up to the managers, and students with classroom experience in operations management outperform managers.


                          Geht in Deutschland das Licht aus?

                          Axel Ockenfels
                          Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nr. 191, 16.08.2008, 11

                          Weil die Investoren abwarten, entstehen keine neuen Kapazitäten, das Risiko einer Stromlücke wächst. Ockenfels erläutert, welche Regeln der Strommarkt braucht, damit die Lichter anbleiben und die vor zehn Jahren erfolgte Liberalisierung doch noch zu dem erhofften großen Erfolg wird.


                          Paying for Performance in Hospitals

                          Burkhard Hehenkamp and Oddvar Kaarbøe
                          working paper (2008)

                          A frequent form of pay-for-performance programs increase reimbursement for all services by a certain percentage of the baseline price. We examine how such a “"bonus-for-quality" ”reimbursement scheme affects the wage contract given to physicians by the hospital management. To this end, we determine the bonus inducing hospitals to incentivize their physicians to meet the quality standard. Additionally, we show that the health care payer has to complement the bonus with a (sometimes negative) block grant. We conclude the paper relating the role of the block grant to recent experiences in the American health care market.


                          On the Equivalence of Nash and Evolutionary Equilibrium in Finite Populations

                          Tobias Guse, Alex Possajennikov and Burkhard Hehenkamp
                          working paper, 2008.

                          This paper provides sufficient and partial necessary conditions for the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in symmetric games played by finite populations. The focus is on symmetric equilibria in pure strategies. The conditions are based on properties of the payoff function that generalize the constant-sum property and the ”smallness” property, the latter of which is known from models of perfect competition and non-atomic, anonymous, or large games. The conditions are illustrated on examples of Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly games.


                          Strategic Unemployment

                          Burkhard Hehenkamp, Julia Angerhausen and Christian Bayer
                          In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. forthcoming

                          The empirical literature on happiness …nds that employment signi…cantly con- tributes to well-being. We propose a dynamic model that explains why individuals may nonetheless be reluctant to pick up low-paid work. Accepting low-paid work will put them in an adverse position in future wage bargaining, as employers could infer the individual’s low reservation wage from his working history. Employers will exploit their knowledge o¤ering low wages to this individual in the future. There- fore, employees with low reservation wage strategically opt into unemployment to signal a high reservation wage.


                          Information Value and Externalities in Reputation Building. An Experimental Study

                          Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels
                          University of Cologne, Working Paper, 2008.

                          In sequential equilibrium theory, reputation building is independent of whether the reputation builder is matched with one long-run player or a series of short run players. We observe, however, that reputation builders are significantly more challenged by long-run players in both laboratory chain store and buyer-seller games. Reputation builder behavior is not as unpredictable as required by the mixed equilibrium strategies and so information about the reputation builder’s past behavior has more economic value than equilibrium predicts. This in turn creates more incentives for long-run players to challenge the reputation builder, because they internalize the information externalities from the continuation game.


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